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A B S T R A C T
Background
The outbreak of highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza in domestic poultry and wild birds has
caused global concern over the possible evolution of a novel human strain [1]. If such a strain
emerges, and is not controlled at source [2,3], a pandemic is likely to result. Health policy in
most countries will then be focused on reducing morbidity and mortality.
Methods and Findings
We estimate the expected reduction in primary attack rates for different household-based
interventions using a mathematical model of influenza transmission within and between
households. We show that, for lower transmissibility strains [2,4], the combination of
household-based quarantine, isolation of cases outside the household, and targeted
prophylactic use of anti-virals will be highly effective and likely feasible across a range of
plausible transmission scenarios. For example, for a basic reproductive number (the average
number of people infected by a typically infectious individual in an otherwise susceptible
population) of 1.8, assuming only 50% compliance, this combination could reduce the infection
(symptomatic) attack rate from 74% (49%) to 40% (27%), requiring peak quarantine and
isolation levels of 6.2% and 0.8% of the population, respectively, and an overall anti-viral
stockpile of 3.9 doses per member of the population. Although contact tracing may be
additionally effective, the resources required make it impractical in most scenarios.
Conclusions
National influenza pandemic preparedness plans currently focus on reducing the impact
associated with a constant attack rate, rather than on reducing transmission. Our findings
suggest that the additional benefits and resource requirements of household-based
interventions in reducing average levels of transmission should also be considered, even
when expected levels of compliance are only moderate.
The Editors’ Summary of this article follows the references.
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Introduction
The basic reproductive number R0 is the average number
of people infected by a typically infectious individual in an
otherwise susceptible population [5]. If the basic reproduc-
tive number is greater than one, the disease has the
potential to spread. If it is less than one, the disease will
die out after only a few generations. The next influenza
pandemic will start when a novel strain of influenza evolves
with R0 . 1 in humans. Wherever in the world the novel
strain evolves, with modern news services and electronic
communication, there will be a period of time during which
the disease is not present in some large populations but is
known to be spreading in other more remote locations. This
presents a window of opportunity for implementing
interventions to reduce R0 prior to the introduction of
the pandemic strain from those remote populations.
Although R0 is sometimes considered to be intrinsic to a
pathogen, it is also dependent on the behavior of the host
population and can vary across time. For instance, for the
severe acute respiratory syndrome that re-emerged during
the winter of 2003–2004 [6], since there was no significant
sustained transmission, R0 was likely to have been lower
than when the virus first circulated during the previous year
[7]. The first-wave infection attack rate (IAR) is defined to be
the proportion of the population infected during the initial
epidemic (i.e., first year) of the circulation of a novel
pathogen and includes both symptomatic and asymptomatic
infection. Specifically, the IAR for pandemic influenza does
not include infections arising during subsequent years.
Public health policy in disease-free populations prior to
the arrival of pandemic influenza should aim to reduce R0,
thus reducing the IAR. The IAR will not be known until
after the first wave has passed and will be either measured
directly, using serological surveys, or estimated from case
reports and knowledge of the proportion of infections that
were symptomatic.
Let RE0 be the effective basic reproductive number for
pandemic influenza in a host population undergoing some
preventive intervention prior to its arrival. Recent analysis of
clinical trial data [8] suggests that RE0¼R0/3.6 can be achieved
with prolonged mass prophylaxis with oseltamivir [2]. There-
fore, pandemic strains with R0 , 3.6 could be controlled, but
this would require a drug stockpile of 56 doses per member of
the population for only 8 wk of protection, which would likely
not be long enough and is currently unfeasible. However,
even in circumstances when an outbreak is not controlled,
the impact of public health interventions that reduce RE0
would still be substantial. Using a very simple model of
disease spread, a precise relationship between IAR and RE0
can be defined (see Figure S3). For high values of RE0 , IAR is
close to one, but for values of RE0 closer to one, IAR is much
lower. Any policies that significantly reduce infectivity and/or
susceptibility, over and above what would be the natural
reaction of the population, will have a similar effect.
Therefore, the potential benefits are large from apparently
small reductions in low values of R0, even when complete
control is not achieved.
Here, we estimate the expected reduction in IAR for
different household-based interventions using a mathemat-
ical model of influenza transmission within and between
households. Household-based interventions, such as volun-
tary quarantine, isolation, and the provision of prophylactic
anti-virals, may be able to reduce the IAR substantially
without consuming resources at the same rate as nontargeted
population-level interventions. Here, ‘‘quarantine’’ refers to
the segregation, within their own homes, of household
contacts of a suspected case from other members of the
community. We use the term ‘‘isolation’’ for when compliant
symptomatic individuals are removed from their household
to a separate facility. We also consider contact tracing, where
individuals are asked to name people who they may have
infected, and those individuals are notified and asked to take
precautionary measures. In order to estimate the impact of
household-based interventions on IAR, a more detailed
representation of the population structure is required.
Therefore, we use an individual-based stochastic model of
influenza transmission (Figure 1) with explicit household,
peer-group, and community settings. Although substantial
progress has been made in recent years [9–12], we were
unable to derive useful analytical approximations describing
the behavior of the required infection and intervention
processes.
Figure 1. The Natural History Assumed for Pandemic Influenza
Individuals progress from S (susceptible) through E (exposed but not yet
infectious), IP (infectious but not yet symptomatic), IA (infectious and
asymptomatic), IS (infectious and symptomatic), IH (infectious and
suffering symptoms severe enough to be hospitalized), and R (recovered
and presumed immune). All deaths occur in the IH stage. We used recent
results [2] derived from a symptom-based household study [15] for the
waiting time of the combined E and IP stages: it is distributed according
to an offset Weibull with offsetþ0.5 d, mean 1.48 d (including the offset),
and standard deviation 0.47 d. The duration of the IP stage was assumed
to be fixed at 0.5 d. The duration of the IS stage was set to be 5/3 that of
the IA stage, but the absolute duration of both stages was determined by
the generation time, Tg (see main text and Table 1). In the model, 33% of
infections were never symptomatic, which is consistent with sources: a
basic reproductive number of 1.8 [2] with a 50% case attack rate [24], and
observations from deliberate infections of humans with H1N1 [25]. We
assumed that 6.0% of symptomatic infections resulted in hospitalization
and 17.2% of these resulted in death (nonpandemic data for community-
acquired pneumonia extracted from the Hospital Authority Integrated
Patient Administrative System, Hospital Authority, Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, 2002). The 6% hospitalization rate is consistent
with the overall 1918 pandemic mortality rate (derived from analyses of
the 1918 pandemic; see Discussion)—67% of infections being sympto-
matic—and with the case fatality rate for all community-acquired
pneumonia admissions to Hong Kong public hospitals. We assumed that
all children and 50% of adults stay at home when symptomatic with
influenza—even when no interventions are in force (consistent with
[20]). This assumption is to ensure that the impact of quarantine is not
overestimated. Note that this parameter was not included in the
sensitivity analyses as its impact was dominated by h, the proportion of
presymptomatic or asymptomatic transmission. Half of transmission
outside the home was assumed to be in the peer group, the other half
was between random pairs of infector and infectee who would not have
been able to name each other during a contact tracing interview.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030361.g001
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Methods
The distribution of household sizes and the average
numbers of children in households of different sizes were
simulated to be consistent with Hong Kong [13]. We made all
interventions active prior to the arrival of the infected
individuals, and we challenged the system with a constant
introduction of 1.5 infected individuals per day per 100,000
people for 365 d. Our results showed no significant
sensitivity when the importation rate was proportional to
an epidemic curve (see Figure S1). Susceptible individuals
reported with influenza-like illness, caused by something
other than the pandemic influenza strain, at a constant rate
of 74 per day per 100,000 people. This provided a constant
stream of false positives, which ensures that the number of
households in quarantine in the early stages of the epidemic
is not underestimated. However, it should be noted that the
relative benefits derived from testing are higher for higher
rates of false positives. The rate we used is approximately
equal to the peak reporting rate of influenza-like illness in
the Hong Kong primary care setting during 2004 (Hong
Kong Centre for Health Protection; http://www.chp.gov.hk/
sentinel.asp?lang¼en&id¼292&pid¼44&ppid¼26). These non-
pandemic cases were symptomatic for 3 d on average.
The hazard of infection from an infectious person to a
susceptible person in a household was set to be inversely
proportional to household size, reflecting recent findings for
endemic influenza household transmission dynamics [14].
Model-generated household attack rates were consistent with
recent empirical studies [15], given uncertainties in the
degree of community transmission present in those studies
(see Figure S2). Workplaces and schools were represented as
large, highly connected peer groups. A further substantial
proportion of transmission, termed ‘‘community’’ trans-
mission, was assumed to be outside of the peer group and
the home. Large network neighborhood sizes and substantial
community transmission are conservative assumptions with
respect to the efficacy of contact tracing: they penalize
contact tracing without significantly affecting other inter-
ventions. A formal definition of the transmission model is
given in Protocol S1. As there was no spatial component in
this model, our results will overestimate the speed of the
epidemic in geographically dispersed populations. However,
large countries will suffer importation of infectious individ-
uals in all regions, and pandemic strains will spread rapidly
between large cities. Therefore, it is unlikely that geo-
graphical heterogeneities will last longer than 1 or 2 wk in
large countries such as the United States [16], which suggests
that there will be little opportunity for the use of spatially
heterogeneous intervention strategies.
An integrated process of voluntary household quarantine,
voluntary individual isolation, anti-viral administration, and
contact tracing was used to predict the impact of household-
based intervention policies. If an individual complied with
household quarantine, their infectiousness to other household
members changed by a factor of eQ. Because quarantine
increases the average time spent at home substantially for
most people, the value of this parameter may be greater than
unity (eQ ¼ 2 at baseline; see Table 1). Also, the level of
transmission in isolation may be higher than elsewhere. We
assumed that the degree of transmission in isolation was a
factor of eI greater (eI¼1 at baseline; see Table 1), i.e., the basic
reproductive number inside transmission was equal to eIR0
(see Protocol S1). Note that we assumed that for all policies,
those individuals with symptoms severe enough to be
hospitalized (see Figure 1) would be isolated. Hence, policies
without explicit isolation elements used isolation resources.
Also, we assumed that all those in isolation received anti-viral
treatment. Hence, policies without explicit anti-viral elements
used anti-viral doses. We modeled compliance at the individ-
ual level: a symptomatic individual in a household that was not
quarantined decided for herself if she reported, but the other
members of her household made independent decisions for
themselves. We defined pc to be the probability of compliance.
These interventions were implemented using the following
algorithm.
Step 1: an individual from households not in voluntary
quarantine had the opportunity to enter the program via one
of the following three routes: she developed symptoms, she
was contacted through contact tracing, or she was hospi-
talized. We assumed she volunteered and actually reported
with probability pc for symptoms and contact tracing, and
with probability one for hospitalization. She complied with
the program until released. After release, individuals were
not bound by previous decisions to join or not join, i.e., they
could choose again.
Step 2: each other member of her household complied with
intervention instructions with probability pc.
Step 3: after a delay of 1 d, all compliant nonsymptomatic
household members took one dose of prophylactic anti-virals
per day when anti-viral policies were in effect. Symptomatic
household members took two doses of anti-virals per day.
Step 4: if contact tracing was in effect, each compliant adult
member of the household named, on average, five members
of their peer group, if she had not been asked to name
contacts before.
Step 5: if isolation was in effect, newly found symptomatic
individuals who were compliant voluntarily entered isolation
with probability pc after a delay of 1 d. If an isolated
individual no longer showed symptoms after 3 d, she was
released from isolation and joined her household, which
might be quarantined. Otherwise, she was isolated for a
further 3 d. This cycle repeated until she no longer showed
symptoms or died (see Figure S4 for the distribution of
durations of quarantine for different policies).
Step 6: isolated individuals were given two doses of anti-
virals per day, without a delay, in all simulations, regardless of
the policy for the use of anti-virals in households.
Step 7: if contact tracing was in effect, contacts (if known
and not already in the program) of all newly found
symptomatic or hospitalized household members were traced
with a mean delay of 1 d.
Step 8: if there had been no new symptoms in compliant
household members or hospitalizations of any household
members for 7 d, the quarantined household was released
from the program at the end of that period. Otherwise, we
returned to Step 5 at the time new symptoms or hospital-
izations occurred.
Results
Baseline Scenarios
Model simulations show that with compliance rates of 50%
all intervention policies (Figure 2) would have an impact on
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the baseline transmission scenario (Table 1). Although none
were capable of complete control, all policies substantially
reduced IAR. The baseline IAR of 74% was reduced to 49%
when voluntary household quarantine (Q) alone was in effect.
While voluntary quarantine with moderate compliance was
not universally effective for all household sizes and trans-
mission settings, it was highly effective in preventing trans-
mission into the community from larger households,
especially those with symptomatic index cases (see Table
S1). However, the peak proportion of the population living in
homes that were quarantined, even with only 50% program
compliance, was 9.6%. The addition of voluntary individual
isolation to Q (QI) further reduced the IAR to 43%, and the
peak number of individuals living in homes that were
quarantined decreased to 7.1%. Moreover, this policy
provided an incentive for households to participate: pre-
sumed-infectious individuals could expect to be prioritized
for health care by entering isolation and would protect
household members by leaving the home. However, this
approach required isolation facilities for up to 0.9% of the
population at the peak of the epidemic.
We considered the use of anti-virals with Q (QA) as an
alternative to isolation. This policy had a similar efficacy to
QI (IAR 44%) at a cost of 3.9 doses of anti-viral per member
of the population but, as would be expected, with a much
smaller peak level of isolation of 0.5%. The use of anti-virals
in addition to QI (QIA) further reduced the IAR to 40% and
the peak proportion of the population living in homes that
were quarantined to 6.2%. Finally, the addition of contact
tracing to QIA (QIAC) reduced the IAR to 34% but increased
the proportion of the population in quarantine considerably
compared with all other policies. The additional require-
ments of contact tracing are unlikely to be justified other
than when the reproductive number is reduced to near one
by other interventions. The prevalence of quarantine and
isolation (Figure 2B and 2C) determines the resources
required by these programs over time, e.g., the total
prevalence of quarantine and isolation on a given day
determines the number of anti-viral doses that would need
to be distributed when QIA was in effect. Note that the
overall efficacy of interventions is reduced if interventions
are delayed until 5% of the population have experienced
symptomatic infection. However, the impact is minimal if the
results are adjusted for the effective population size of 92.5%
(see Figure S6).
Sensitivity Analyses
As the influenza strain that will cause the next pandemic
has not yet been observed, it is not possible to estimate its
level of transmissibility (other than by using historical data
from other strains [2,4]) or the balance of transmission
between different settings. A multivariate range of plausible
transmission scenarios (Table 1) represents both scientific
uncertainty about the nature of influenza transmission across
different populations and genuine stochasticity associated
with a single evolutionary event. Even the most meticulous
preparedness plan should be robust against a range of
transmission scenarios. We used extensive Latin hypercube
sampling [17] to conduct sensitivity analyses, the results of
which suggest that variation in the efficacy of policies in
reducing the attack rate will be dominated by the basic
reproductive number, R0 (Figures 3A–3D and S3). Further, all
interventions were considerably more effective and used
fewer resources for lower values of R0. Although current low
estimates of R0 [2,4] (based on historical data) are encourag-
ing, in the event of a pandemic, rapid estimates of R0 based
Table 1. Assumptions for Key Unknown Transmission Parameters
Parameter Baseline
Value
Range for
Sensitivity
Analyses
Notes/References
R0, the average number of secondary cases
generated by a typically infectious individual
in an otherwise susceptible population
1.8 [1, 3] [2,4]
h, the proportion of transmission by people
who are not symptomatic (either presymptomatic
or asymptomatic)
0.3 [0, 0.5] Very few data are available to inform this parameter. Upper bound of 0.5 from
Ref [26]. This value is based on reanalysis of a secondary report [27] of data from
an unpublished Soviet study.
Tg, the average time between the infection of
an infector and the infection of his or her infectees
3.2 [2.6, 3.8] Baseline value and lower bound from [20]. Upper bound chosen so that interval
is symmetric. Absolute durations of symptomatic and asymptomatic infectious
stages derived from this parameter.
Proportion of infections counted in h by those
who are never symptomatic
0.5 [0.33, 0.8] Broad sensitivity analysis. Lower bound must be greater than proportion of cases
asymptomatic.
Proportion of transmission outside the home
(peer group and community)
0.7 [0.45, 0.8] Recent reanalysis [20] of data from France [15] and the United States [28] sup-
ports a baseline value of 0.7. Both these datasets are from nonpandemic years.
Hence, the low lower bound reflects a possible increased tendency to stay at
home during pandemics.
eQ, ratio of household infectivity of individuals
who are quarantined compared to those who
are not
2 [0.5,4] Broad sensitivity analysis.
eI, ratio of transmissibility in isolation compared
with overall level of transmission outside isolation
1 [0.5,4] Principal results not sensitive to this parameter. See main text for description of a
univariate sensitivity analysis.
Ranges presented here were used for the multivariate sensitivity analyses shown in Figures 3. Parameters were translated into relative hazards for different disease stages and transmission
settings (see Protocol S1).
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030361.t001
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on contemporaneous data from early national epidemics will
be crucial for finalizing public health responses elsewhere.
The results presented in Figure 3 suggest that the efficacy
of QA was not substantially less than that of QIA for most
parameter combinations. It is interesting that the potential
for increased transmission in isolation did not seem to
decrease substantially the efficacy of the QI strategy (eI, the
ratio of transmissibility in isolation to overall transmissibility
outside isolation, varied from 0.5 to 4). In order to explore
this finding further, we performed a univariate sensitivity
analysis of the impact of changes in the relative trans-
missibility in isolation, eI (baseline parameter values: eI ¼ 1,
IAR 43%), on the efficacy of the QI policy. We found that
even with isolation transmissibility levels ten times greater
than those outside isolation, the QI policy was still effective
(eI ¼ 10, IAR 45%) when compared with Q alone (IAR 49%).
This result occurred because the overall proportion of
susceptible individuals entering isolation was low. Note that
this proportion may have been high during the initial stages
(as perhaps occurred in some settings during the 2003 SARS
outbreak) but would likely be small when averaged over the
entire course of the epidemic.
All estimated reductions in IAR were sensitive to the
population compliance rate, pc, and to h, the proportion of
transmission that was either asymptomatic or presympto-
matic (Figure 4A). Values of pc ¼ 50% and h ¼ 30% were
assumed for baseline intervention scenarios (Table 1; Figures
2 and 3). Our estimated changes in IAR were also sensitive to
the delay in the provision of anti-virals to households and to
the delay in the isolation of symptomatic individuals (Figure
4B), although less so than to pc and h. In deciding whether to
implement any or all of the policies described here, local
public health officials may wish to consider available
epidemiological data (to assess R0 and h) and also estimate
the levels of compliance that could be achieved for the
different options in their populations. As compliance may be
higher for policies that provide immediate benefits to the
individual, we suggest that compliance will be low for Q,
higher for QI and QA, and higher still for QIA. It is likely that
the provision of anti-viral prophylaxis and treatment would
increase compliance substantially. Our baseline assumption
of 50% compliance is intended to be conservative. Intuitively,
it seems likely that household-based interventions would
work with high levels of compliance. Here, we have shown
that even moderate levels of compliance would allow house-
hold-based public health interventions to be effective. Also,
the marginal benefits of the use of anti-virals or isolation
(policies QI, QA, and QIA versus Q) may not be justified if the
average times for the provision of these services exceed 3 to 4
d, given that the quarantine period is set at 7 d.
Levels of compliance with quarantine and isolation would
likely be improved in the early and late stages of the epidemic
by the availability of a viable diagnostic. During the middle
stage of the epidemic, the incidence of pandemic influenza
will be much higher than that of other ‘‘background’’
respiratory infections. During this period, influenza-like
symptoms will be an accurate indicator of infection with
the pandemic strain. We also considered the impact of
virological testing as a diagnostic support for these policies
(see Protocol S1). However, current low throughput (limited
by both laboratory infrastructure and supplies of reagent)
and low test sensitivity (due mainly to difficulties in obtaining
Figure 2. Baseline Transmission (None) and Five Intervention Scenarios:
Q, QI, QA, QIA, and QIAC
(A) shows the incidence of infection, (B) the percentage of the
population living in homes that were quarantined, and (C) the
percentage of the population in isolation. We assumed that infectivity
within households increased by 100% for each individual who complied
with quarantine. For peer groups, quarantine reduced both trans-
missibility and susceptibility to 25% of the nonquarantined level.
Therefore, the rate of transmission decreased by 75% within a peer
group when one of two infected individuals complied with quarantine
and by 96% if both did. For the results presented here, we assumed a
compliance rate of 50% (see Methods). If individuals complied, they were
not infectious to the wider community. When anti-viral treatments were
used they reduced susceptibility to 30% of its baseline value and
transmissibility to 69% of its baseline value. These are the conservative
bounds of the 95% confidence intervals from analyses of clinical trial
data for oseltamivir [8]. Results presented here are averages of 100
realizations in a population of 1,000,000 individuals, but there was no
significant change for populations of 500,000 or 2,000,000. The 95%
stochastic prediction intervals (not shown) do vary with population size,
but are narrow (less than 5% deviation from mean values) for simulations
in populations of 1,000,000.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030361.g002
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adequate specimens outside of specialized care settings)
meant that it was not a worthwhile addition. If an
inexpensive, easy-to-perform, rapid, and accurate test were
to become available, it would have a significant impact on
transmission and on peak levels of quarantine when used as
part of a wider household-based program (Figure S5).
Discussion
We have shown that, for lower transmissibility strains of
pandemic influenza, the combination of household-based
quarantine, isolation of cases outside the household, and
targeted prophylactic use of anti-virals will be highly effective
and likely feasible across a range of plausible transmission
scenarios, even with only moderate levels of compliance.
Further, we have quantified the resources consumed by this
and similar policies in terms of numbers of people
quarantined, numbers of people isolated, and doses of anti-
virals required.
Sequence and phylogenetic analyses of the complete
genome of the 1918 human influenza strain suggest it was
closely related to avian strains [18]. In addition, recent
analyses of the first wave of that pandemic to pass through
New York City have estimated an overall excess mortality
Figure 3. Multivariate Sensitivity Analyses
(A–E) The efficacy of different household-based intervention policies (same color key as in Figure 2) compared to taking no action for 200 random
samples, selected using a Latin hypercube [17], across a multivariate range of transmission parameters (see Table 1). The y-axes show the expected IAR
for the first wave. Variation in IAR for a given R0 is driven by variation in other transmission parameters rather than by stochastic variation.
(F–J) The maximum prevalence and incidence of quarantine and isolation and the total number of drug doses used per member of the population
(same color key as in [A–E]). For maximum values, the average of individual realization maximums is used as the overall maximum. Incidences are daily.
We assume that all isolated individuals (including those who are hospitalized) receive anti-viral treatment. Results presented here are averages of 100
realizations in a population of 500,000 individuals. Sub-samples at 1,000,000 show no significant differences in these patterns. R0 values are based on
R0 , the average number of secondary cases generated by an individual chosen at random in an otherwise susceptible population: R0 ¼ 1:017R0 (see
Figure S3).
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030361.g003
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within the general population of 0.5% [19]. With an IAR of
74% (consistent with a basic reproductive number of 1.8), this
corresponds to an infection mortality rate of 0.7%. There-
fore, if we assume that the natural history of the next
pandemic strain will be similar to that of the 1918 strain, a
reduction in IAR from 74% to 40% would avert 16,000 deaths
during the period of the initial wave of the pandemic in a city
the size of Hong Kong (6.8 million people). Our results
suggest that such a reduction could be achieved using the
combination of voluntary quarantine, individual isolation,
and anti-viral therapy. The use of isolation on such a large
scale may be somewhat controversial, given the infrastructure
requirements of such a policy. Therefore, for populations
with large stockpiles of anti-virals available, the marginal
benefit of the additional use of isolation may not be justified.
However, there will be populations for which the large-scale
stockpiling of anti-virals is not feasible and for which
individual isolation represents the best possible addition to
household quarantine.
Our results build on previous modeling studies of pandemic
influenza that focused primarily on the possibility of contain-
ment using geographically targeted anti-viral therapy [2,3].
Here, and in two other recent studies [20,21], effective
strategies have been identified for mitigation rather than
containment. The key outcome of mitigation studies is the
reduction in IAR, rather than the likelihood of complete
control. Given that many epidemiological parameters asso-
ciated with the next influenza pandemic are unknown,
comparison of results from different modeling studies is not
straightforward. Ferguson et al. [20] assumed that only
infections that were severe enough to require medical care
(50%) would be reported and could be used to trigger
interventions. We assumed that during the next pandemic,
67% (all symptomatic) of infections could be reported and
used to trigger interventions. Our more optimistic assump-
tion about the symptomatic rate was balanced by assuming
that only 50% of symptomatic cases would comply with our
policies and report, whereas Ferguson et al. [20] assumed that
90% of clinical cases would receive anti-viral treatment (with
their household receiving anti-viral prophylaxis) and that
50% of households would comply with quarantine. If we had
assumed a 50% clinical attack rate rather than 67%, we would
have estimated a reduction in symptomatic attack rate from
37% to 22% for the policy of QA. This estimate is consistent
with the reduction in attack rate from 34% to 20% in Figure 3
of Ferguson et al. [20]. However, our results are not consistent
with Table 2 of Germann et al. [21], in which a 10-fold
reduction in the numbers of ill people is reported for the use
of targeted anti-viral prophylaxis (60% case ascertainment, R0
¼1.9, unlimited supply of anti-virals). This large discrepancy is
most likely due to the optimistic nature of their policy: they
assume that households, household clusters, schools, and
workplaces can be targeted very efficiently for prophylactic
anti-viral therapy. We suggest that a highly efficient contact
tracing process would be required to achieve high levels of
coverage between socially connected households in modern
urban populations, and, further, our results suggest that such
a process would require unfeasibly large numbers of house-
holds to be recruited during short periods of time.
Individual decisions to comply with available quarantine or
isolation programs, or to choose between them, will be
substantially influenced by household structure, perceived
benefits, and the presumed infection status of household
members. For example, young children are very unlikely to
enter isolation alone at any stage during the outbreak,
whereas a symptomatic adult with an uninfected spouse and
uninfected children would be much more likely to do so.
Here, we have not incorporated this level of detail: we have
shown that moderate average compliance could bring about
substantial population-level benefits. Also, the nature of
compliance behavior may change over the course of the
outbreak. With these issues in mind, the quarantine and
isolation process investigated here is being refined as a topic
of ongoing investigation. In parallel, there is a clear need for
psycho-behavioral surveillance studies [22] to estimate likely
Figure 4. Bivariate Sensitivity Analyses
(A) The sensitivity of our estimates of the efficacy of Q to changes in the
compliance rate and to changes in h, the proportion of infections that
are either asymptomatic or presymptomatic.
(B) The sensitivity of our estimates of the efficacy of QIA to changes in
the delay in the delivery of drugs to quarantined households and to
changes in the delay in the isolation of individuals.
All other parameters are held constant at their baseline values (see
Figure 1 and Table 1).
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030361.g004
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levels of compliance and to identify factors that would
influence the decisions of individuals and households.
Implicit in the results presented here is the assumption that
reducing the first-wave attack rate should be the primary goal
of influenza preparedness planning. When complete trans-
mission control is not achieved, this necessarily implies a
longer epidemic. If the mortality rate of the pandemic strain
is considered to be low in the local context, it is likely that
some governments will place greater priority on reducing the
duration of the outbreak than on reducing the number of
infections. We suggest that designing policy for a longer
period of societal disruption may be justified not only by
reduced mortality but also by reduced peak stresses on the
society as a whole. For example, for the baseline case, we
found that QIA could reduce the peak incidence of infection
from 3.7% to 0.8%. Although such analyses are beyond the
scope of this work, the likelihood of maintaining uninter-
rupted key societal services (such as law enforcement, food
distribution, and utility provision) may improve substantially
across this range of reduction in infection incidence. There-
fore, the potential massive adverse economic implications of
a temporary breakdown may justify extending the expected
period of disruption.
We have focused on measures to increase social distance
that will consume substantial resources and for which
detailed planning is required. To allow quarantined individ-
uals to remain at home, provision must be made for food,
water, and medicines to be delivered. This may be achieved
through a central system or a neighborhood assistance
scheme. For isolation, careful planning and investment would
be required so that large facilities can be made operational in
time to reduce transmission in the early stages of the
epidemic. For anti-virals to be provided efficiently, a
dedicated distribution system may be required. A recent
review [23] suggests that household quarantine was not
successfully implemented on any significant scale during the
1918 city-level epidemics upon which estimates of trans-
missibility are based [2,4]. Therefore, we suggest that the
likely impact of the interventions we describe here is real and
not already incorporated into estimates of transmissibility.
Further, we suggest that modern transport and communica-
tion infrastructures are sufficiently more advanced than
those available in 1918 that it is reasonable to expect that
such interventions can now succeed.
Many countries have put in place formal pandemic
preparedness plans following a framework set out by the
World Health Organization. These national plans do mention
the interventions included here, but they do not yet specify
how these intervention processes will be implemented in even
the broadest terms, nor do they attempt to predict the levels
of resources required. We believe that our findings, and
future studies that match detailed descriptions of interven-
tions with realistic transmission models, can help to inform
pandemic preparedness plans by quantifying both the
benefits of, and resources required for, household-based
interventions against pandemic influenza.
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Editors’ Summary
Background. Naturally occurring variation in the influenza virus can lead
both to localized annual epidemics and to less frequent global
pandemics of catastrophic proportions. The most destructive of the
three influenza pandemics of the 20th century, the so-called Spanish flu
of 1918–1919, is estimated to have caused 20 million deaths. As
evidenced by ongoing tracking efforts and news media coverage of
H5N1 avian influenza, contemporary approaches to monitoring and
communications can be expected to alert health officials and the general
public of the emergence of new, potentially pandemic strains before
they spread globally.
Why Was This Study Done? In order to act most effectively on advance
notice of an approaching influenza pandemic, public health workers
need to know which available interventions are likely to be most
effective. This study was done to estimate the effectiveness of specific
preventive measures that communities might implement to reduce the
impact of pandemic flu. In particular, the study evaluates methods to
reduce person-to-person transmission of influenza, in the likely scenario
that complete control cannot be achieved by mass vaccination and anti-
viral treatment alone.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? The researchers developed a
mathematical model—essentially a computer simulation—to simulate
the course of pandemic influenza in a hypothetical population at risk for
infection at home, through external peer networks such as schools and
workplaces, and through general community transmission. Parameters
such as the distribution of household sizes, the rate at which individuals
develop symptoms from nonpandemic viruses, and the risk of infection
within households were derived from demographic and epidemiologic
data from Hong Kong, as well as empirical studies of influenza
transmission. A model based on these parameters was then used to
calculate the effects of interventions including voluntary household
quarantine, voluntary individual isolation in a facility outside the home,
and contact tracing (that is, asking infectious individuals to identify
people whom they may have infected and then warning those people)
on the spread of pandemic influenza through the population. The model
also took into account the anti-viral treatment of exposed, asymptomatic
household members and of individuals in isolation, and assumed that all
intervention strategies were put into place before the arrival of
individuals infected with the pandemic virus.
Using this model, the authors predicted that even if only half of the
population were to comply with public health interventions, the
proportion infected during the first year of an influenza pandemic could
be substantially reduced by a combination of household-based
quarantine, isolation of actively infected individuals in a location outside
the household, and targeted prophylactic treatment of exposed
individuals with anti-viral drugs. Based on an influenza-associated
mortality rate of 0.5% (as has been estimated for New York City in the
1918–1919 pandemic), the magnitude of the predicted benefit of these
interventions is a reduction from 49% to 27% in the proportion of the
population who become ill in the first year of the pandemic, which
would correspond to 16,000 fewer deaths in a city the size of Hong Kong
(6.8 million people). In the model, anti-viral treatment appeared to be
about as effective as isolation when each was used in combination with
household quarantine, but would require stockpiling 3.9 doses of anti-
viral for each member of the population. Contact tracing was predicted
to provide a modest additional benefit over quarantine and isolation, but
also to increase considerably the proportion of the population in
quarantine.
What Do These Findings Mean? This study predicts that voluntary
household-based quarantine and external isolation can be effective in
limiting the morbidity and mortality of an influenza pandemic, even if
such a pandemic cannot be entirely prevented, and even if compliance
with these interventions is far from uniform. These simulations can
therefore inform preparedness plans in the absence of data from actual
intervention trials, which would be impossible outside (and impractical
within) the context of an actual pandemic. Like all mathematical models,
however, the one presented in this study relies on a number of
assumptions regarding the characteristics and circumstances of the
situation that it is intended to represent. For example, the authors found
that the efficacy of policies to reduce the rate of infection vary according
to the ease with which a given virus spreads from person to person.
Because this parameter (known as the basic reproductive ratio, R0)
cannot be reliably predicted for a new viral strain based on past
epidemics, the authors note that in an actual influenza pandemic rapid
determinations of R0 in areas already involved would be necessary to
finalize public health responses in threatened areas. Further, the
implementation of the interventions that appear beneficial in this model
would require devoting attention and resources to practical consid-
erations, such as how to staff isolation centers and provide food and
water to those in household quarantine. However accurate the scientific
data and predictive models may be, their effectiveness can only be
realized through well-coordinated local, as well as international, efforts.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via the online
version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.
0030361.
 World Health Organization influenza pandemic preparedness page
 US Department of Health and Human Services avian and pandemic flu
information site
 Pandemic influenza page from the Public Health Agency of Canada
 Emergency planning page on pandemic flu from the England
Department of Health
 Wikipedia entry on pandemic influenza with links to individual country
resources (note: Wikipedia is a free Internet encyclopedia that anyone
can edit)
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